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698 MELANCON v. SuPERIOR CouRT [42 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22883. In Bank. Apr. 16, 1954.] 
CLEMENT J. MELANCON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Prohibition - Grounds - Constitutional Questions.-Where 
there is no other adequate remedy, such as by appeal, the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance may be tested by 
prohibition on ground that invalidity of legislation goes to 
jurisdiction of court to proceed to try case. 
[2] Mandamus-To Courts-Depositions: Prohibition-Adequacy 
of Remedy by Appeal.-Where hearing on defendants' motions 
to require plaintiff in a derivative stockholders' suit to furnish 
security for reasonable expenses which they may incur in de-
fending suit (see Corp. Code, § 834) has been held and an 
order for furnishing security by plaintiff has been made prior 
to consideration by Supreme Court of his petition for writ of 
mandamus to compel superior court to enforce his claimed 
right to take depositions of certain individual defendants and 
officers of corporate defendants, and of his petition for writ 
of prohibition to restrain lower court from proceeding with 
hearing of defendants' motions to require him to furnish 
security, the remedy by appeal from judgment of dismissal 
which presumably will follow if ordered security is not fur-
nished is an adequate and more appropriate remedy than the 
writs sought. 
[3] Prohibition- Acts Prohibitable- Completed Proceedings.-
Prohibition ordinarily issues only to prevent future judicial 
acts rather than to undo acts already performed. 
[ 4] !d.-Acts Prohibitable-Completed Proceedings.-No such ag-
gravated circumstances or consequential damages would appear 
to flow from an order requiring the furnishing of security by 
plaintiff in a derivative stockholders' action, or from entry of 
an appealable judgment of dismissal which would follow plain-
tiff's failure to comply with security order, as to come within 
exception to rule that prohibition issues only to prevent future 
judicial acts. 
[1] Determination of unconstitutionality of statute in prohibi-
tion proceeding, note, 113 A.L.R. 796. See, also, Cal.Jur., Pro-
hibition, § 4; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 32. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Prohibition, § 3; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 47. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, § 15; [2] Mandamus, 
§54; Prohibitiort, § 14(1); [3, 4] Prohibition,§ 6; [5] Prohibition, 
§14(1); [6] Mandamus, §100; Prohibition, §58; [7, 9] Deposi-
tions, § 8; [8] Constitutional Law, § 180; [10] Constitutional Law, 
§ 174; [11] Depositions, § 41; [12-17] Corporations, § 368.5. 
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[5] Id-Expense of Remedy by AppeaL-The expense of an appeal 
is insufficient to justify issuance of a writ of prohibition. 
[6] Mandamus- Hearing: Prohibition- Hearing.-Various com-
plaints made by plaintiff in a derivative stockholders' suit 
as to rulings by trial court on evidence offered by him on hear-
ing of defendants' motion to require him to furnish security, 
such as that one defendant subpoenaed by plaintiff as a wit-
ness was excused from testifying at such hearing because of 
illness, that another defendant was allowed more security than 
he requested, and that, although one continuance of such 
hearing was granted plaintiff to permit subpoena by him of 
certain witnesses, he was refused a further continuance al-
though he had been unable to serve the subpoenas, may not 
properly be considered on his application for mandamus to 
compel superior court to enforce his claimed right to take 
depositions and for writ of prohibition restraining lower court 
from proceeding with hearing on defendants' motions, but only 
on an appeal and a record of the hearing. 
[7] Depositions-Time When Taken.-Refusal by trial court in a 
derivative stockholders' suit to order completion of depositions 
sought by plaintiff prior to hearing on defendants' motions 
to require him to furnish security, even if erroneous, would not 
violate his rights in a constitutional or jurisdictional sense, 
where he was given a full opportunity to subpoena and pro-
duce witnesses and to elicit evidence, both oral and by affidavit, 
and he did so at the hearing on such motions. 
[8] Constitutional Law-Due Process-Hearing.-A hearing be-
fore judgment, with full opportunity to present all the evi-
dence and arguments which the party deems important, is 
all that can be adjudged vital under guaranty of due process 
of law. 
[9] Depositions-Time When Taken.-Opportunity to take deposi-
tions of witnesses prior to a trial or hearing is not a require-
ment of due process. 
[10] Constitutional Law-Due Process.-Mere erroneous construc-
tion of statutes does not constitute a denial of due process. 
[11] Depositions-Proceedings to Perpetuate Testimony.-Under 
perpetuation of evidence statutes (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2083-
2089), plaintiff on a proper showing could take depositions 
of defendants prior to filing his stockholder's derivative 
action, and thereby discover whether there is sufficient prob-
ability of benefit to corporation to justify bringing the action. 
[12] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation 
-Security for Costs.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to security 
[8] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 325; Am.Jur., Constitu-
tional Law, § 637. 
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for coRts and fees as condition to mnin-
i,r·narHH' of' stockholdPr',.; dPrivative snit. appli<'s only In action~ 
(',OllllflCllCt'd. 
[13] on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs.---f'Iaintiff is not entitlnd to proceed with the deposi-
tions he seeks in the course of preparing for eventual trial 
of his stockholder's derivative action where he has not com-
plied with order of court for posting of security for costs 
and attorneys' fees pursuant to Corp. Code, § 834, since the 
taking of depositions for such purpose would constitute a 
step in "prosecution" of action and therefore falls within 
the "stay" provisions of such code section. 
[14] Id.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation- Se-
curity for Costs.-vVhere court has made order requiring plain-
tiff in his stockholder's derivative suit to furnish security 
for reasonable expenses which defendants may incur in de-
fending suit (see Corp. Code, § 834), court may properly 
refuse to proceed further with respect to depositions, which 
plaintiff seeks, until such time as he complies with order 
respecting security, and the fact that defendants may take 
such depositions in the meantime does not deprive plaintiff 
of equal protection of the law. 
[15] Id. - Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation- Se-
curity for Costs.-Cause of stockholder's derivative action does 
not belong to plaintiff but belongs to corporation, and Corp. 
Code, § 834, relating to security for costs and attorneys' fees 
as condition precedent to maintenance of such action, neither 
adds to nor subtracts from cause of action. 
[16] Id.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation- Se-
curity for Costs.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to security for 
costs and attorneys' fees as condition precedent to maintenance 
of such action, when applied only to actions instituted since 
its enactment is wholly procedural in its effect in a state 
court; it merely prescribes the condition on which a volunteer 
plaintiff may maintain a suit on corporation's cause of action. 
[17] Id.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation- Se-
curity for Costs.-If plaintiff in stockholder's derivative suit 
posts security ordered by court and then proceeds with the 
securing of evidence by way of depositions he may there-
after, as an incident of procedural scheme set up by Corp. 
Code, § 834, apply to trial court for a decrease in amount of 
security on showing that the security provided is excessive. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County to enforce petitioner's claimed right 
to take depositions in connection with a derivative stockhold-
ers' suit, and proceeding in prohibition to restrain such court 
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from proceeding with a hearing to require petitioner to furnish 
security for expenses which defendants may incur in deriva-
tive suit. Writs denied. 
Guy E. Ward and David B. Heyler, Jr., for Petitioner. 
Kenneth N. Chantry and David Mellinkoff as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioner. 
Harold \V. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and 
William E. Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, for Re-
spondent. 
O'Melveny & Myers, William W. Alsup, Philip F. West-
brook, Jr., Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd Wright, 
Charles A. Loring, Loeb & Loeb, Herman F. Selvin, Allen E. 
Susman and John L. Cole, for Real Parties in Interest. 
SCHAUER, J.--Petitioner seeks mandate to compel the 
superior court to enforce his claimed right to take the deposi-
tions of certain of the individual defendants, and officers of 
corporate defendants, in connection with a derivative stock-
holders' suit filed by petitioner, a stockholder in and as plain-
tiff on behalE of, defendant corporation vV alt Disney Pro-
ductions. The other defendants named are another corpora-
tion and seven individuals. Petitioner1 also asked for a writ 
of prohibition restraining the lower conrt from proceeding 
with a hearing (pending when the petition was filed but 
concluded before the alternative writs issued) on defendants' 
motions to require petitioner to furnish security, under the 
provisions of section 834 of the Corporations Code, for the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which de-
fendants may incur in defending the derivative stockholders' 
suit. The alternative writs issued, but for reasons hereinafter 
stated we have concluded that the peremptory writs should 
be denied and the alternative writs discharged. 
Prior to our consideration of the petition for the writs 
the lower court heard the motions for security, granted them 
as to all except one defendant, and on September 4, 1953, 
made and signed written findings and conclusions and an 
order that plaintiff furuish a total of $65,500 as security 
within 30 days after service upon plaintiff of written notice 
of the signing of the order, that plaintiff serve written notice 
1Sometimes hereinafter referred to as plaintiff. 
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on defendants' counsel of the deposit of the security within 
10 days "after plaintiff has complied with this order," and 
that further prosecution of the action by plaintiff "is hereby 
stayed, and said defendants need not file any pleadings 
herein'' until 30 days after plaintiff shall have served the 
notice of his compliance with the order for security, with a 
further stay until 20 days after plaintiff's sureties have justi-
fied in case defendants except to such sureties. Thereafter, 
on September 10, we ordered issuance of the alternative writs; 
at that time we had not been informed of the hearing held 
and order made by the lower court. The writs issued com-
manding respondent court to show cause why the depositions 
should not be ordered and prohibiting "any further proceed-
ings with reference to a hearing on said Motions to require 
security, except as directed hereby, until the further order 
of this Court thereon." Thereafter, on September 16, peti-
tioner filed a supplemental petition for the two writs, alleging 
the hearing in the lower court on the security motions and 
the written order of September 4 granting them, and asking 
that such order be set aside and petitioner ''be permitted 
to take the depositions of all party defendants," or, alterna-
tively, that that court be restrained from dismissing the action 
if plaintiff fails to furnish the security ordered. 
From the petition (as supplemented) for the writs and 
the return and answer thereto it appears that since 1947 
plaintiff has been a shareholder of Walt Disney Productions,2 
a corporation. He filed his derivative action against that 
corporation, certain of its alleged officers and directors, and 
Walt Disney, Incorporated,3 a corporation. He asked that 
certain contracts between Disney Productions and defendant 
Walter E. Disney, and between Disney Productions and Dis-
ney, Inc., be declared invalid; that Walter E. Disney and 
Disney, Inc., account for all moneys received by virtue of 
such contracts; that Walter E. Disney account for sums paid 
him by Disney Productions as compensation for services ren-
dered since 1940; and that Disney Productions and its officers 
and directors be enjoined from making further payments 
under the contracts attacked by plaintiff. 
After filing the derivative action, plaintiff gave notices and 
had served subpoenas duces tecum for the taking of deposi-
tions of certain of the defendants and corporate officers; upon 
"Hereinafter sometimes referred to as Disney Productions. 
"Hereinafter sometimes referred to as Disney, Inc. 
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their refusals either to be sworn or to answer various ques-
tions they were directed to appear for court rulings thereon. 
Meanwhile all defendants filed motions to require plaintiff 
to furnish security for expenses, including attorney's fees, 
under section 834 of the Corporations Code. Also, the court 
stayed further proceedings on the depositions until after 
the hearing and order on the motions for security. This peti-
tion (as supplemented) for mandamus and prohibition fol-
lowed. As above noted, we acted on the petition without 
having been informed that the lower court had theretofore 
heard and granted the motions for security4 and had stayed 
further prosecution of the action until the security was 
furnished. 5 
In support of the order requiring such security the court 
found, among other things (in the language of § 834), "That 
there is no reasonable probability that the prosecution of 
the cause of action alleged . . . will benefit the corporation 
or its security holders.'' 
Petitioner in support of his contention that this case is a 
proper one for the issuance of the jurisdictional writ of 
prohibition, attacks, on grounds for the most part substan-
tially the same as those recently discussed in Beyerbach v. 
Juno Oil Co. (1954), ante, p. 11 [265 P.2d 1], the 
constitutionality of the security provisions here involved. 
[1] It is now established in this state that where there is 
no other adequate remedy, such as by appeal, ''The constitu-
tionality of a statute or ordinance may be tested by prohibi-
4Except the motion of defendant Disney, Inc., which the court held 
was "a third party defendant" as to which the court "has no constitu. 
tional authority to grant the motion'' to require plaintiff to furnish 
security. For that reason only, the motion of such defendant was denied. 
In this view the court erred under our holding in Beyerbach v. Juno 
Oil Co., ante, pp. 11, 23 [26:> P.2d 1], filed January 5, 1934, sub-
sequent to the trial court's ruling herein. 
5 From supplemental briefs now on file herein, it further appears that 
plaintiff has not yet posted the security ordered by the court, but in· 
stead, on October 2, 1953, moved the court for an extension of time 
within which to furnish it. That motion "was heard on the 7th day of 
October, 1953, and because of the alternative writs having been issued," 
the trial court continued the hearing on the motion until January 18, 
1954. Meanwhile, plaintiff has served and filed a notice of appeal from 
the order requiring the security, and defendant Disney, Inc., whose motion 
for security was denied in the same order, has done likewise. The 
supplemental briefs also make mention of an "intervener" whom the 
trial court, ' 'after the security motions had been made,'' permitted to 
appear on the plaintiff's side; defendants then moved to subject the 
intervener to the security order and hearing on the motion "was post-
poned by the trial court." 
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tion on the ground that invalidity of the legislation goes to 
the jurisdiction of the court to proceed to try the case." 
(Rescue Army v. Mt~nicipal Cour·t (1946), 28 Cal.2d 460, 
462-467 [171 P.2d 8]; see, also, Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102, 
1103; Hunter v. Justice's Cottrt (1950), 36 Cal.2d 315, 323 
[223 P.2d 465].) By our opinion in the Beyerbach case 
petitioner's attacks on the statute have been answered ad-
versely to him in most respects. 
His remaining contentions concern the depositions he sought 
to take. He urges that by refusing to compel completion 
of the depositions the trial court deprived him of the means 
of effectively obtaining evidence to oppose the motions for 
security, particularly with respect to whether there is a "rea-
sonable probability that the prosecution of the cause of action 
alleged . . . will beneflt the corporation or its security hold-
ers" (Corp. Code, § 834), and that he was thereby denied 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, petitioner relies 
upon section 2021 of thr Code of Civil Procedure6 and upon 
cases in which mandamus has issued to compel the lower court 
to enforce the right to take depositions or to perpetuate 
testimony. (See JJf cClatchy Newspapers v. Sttperior Court 
(1945), 26 Cal.2d 386 [159 P.2d 944]; Brown v. Superior 
Court (1949), 34 Cal.2d 559 [212 P.2d 878]; Superior Ins. 
Co. v. Superior Court (1951), 37 Cal.2d 749 [235 P.2d 833].) 
[2] In none of the cited cases, however, had the hearing 
or trial in connection with which the testimony or deposition 
was sought been held and the order or judgment of the trial 
court been rendered prior to the issuance of an alternative 
writ or writs by the appellate court. By contrast, in the 
matter now before us, as already noted, the hearing on the 
motions for security had been held, over a period of three 
days, and the order for the furnishing of the security by 
plaintiff had been made prior to the consideration by this 
court of the petition for the writs. Under such circumstances 
it appears that the remedy by appeal from the judgment of 
dismissal which presumably will follow if the ordered security 
is not furnished is not only an adequate, but is clearly a more 
appropriate remedy than the writs here sought. 
[3] In the first place, the rule is that prohibition ordi-
"Section 2021: ''The testimony of a witness in this State may be 
taken by deposition in any action at any time after the service of the 
summons or the appearance of the defendant .... '' 
'' 1. When the witness is a party to the action or proceeding or an 
officer, member, agent, or employee of a corporation .... '' 
Apr. 1954] MELANCON v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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narily issues acts rather thau 
to undo acts State Board Eqttali-
zation v. Superior Court , 9 Cal.2d 254 P.2d 
482]; 21 Cal.Jur. and cases there cited.) Al-
though exceptions to this rule have been made and the writ 
has been allowed where the act in is a continuing 
one and the circumstances are so as to justify 
immediate relief, such as where a receiver has been appointed, 
an injunction has issued, or property has been seized under a 
void order (see Evans v. Court (1939), 14 Cal.2d 
563, 580-581 [96 P.2cl 107], and cases there cited), and 
"where, because of delay, there would be consequential clam-
ages" ( GoTden State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court (1939), 
13 Cal.2d 384, 389 [90 P.2cl 75]), no such aggravated circum-
stances or consequential damages would appear to flow from 
the order requiring the furnishing of security by plaintiff 
in the derivative stockholders' action, or from the entry of 
an appealable judgment of dismissal which would follow 
plaintiff's failure to comply with the security order. [5] As 
recently reaffirmed in Jollie v. Superior Court (1951), 38 CaL 
2cl 52, 56 [237 P.2d 641], the expense of an appeal is insuffi-
cient to justify issuance of the writ of prohibition. 
[6] In the second place, petitioner in his third supple-
mental petition for the writs, complains of rulings by the 
court on evidence offered by him as plaintiff at the three-day 
hearing on the security motions, complains that one of the 
defendants subpoenaed by plaintiff as a witness was excused 
from testifying at such hearing because of illness, complains 
that although one eight-day continuance of such hearing was 
granted plaintiff in order to permit subpoena by him of cer-
tain witnesses he was refused a further continuance although 
he had been unable to serve the subpoenas, and complains 
that one defendant was allowed more security than he re-
quested. It seems apparent from a mere statement of these 
various complaints tl1at they do not go to the court's juris-
diction and may not properly be considered on this applica-
tion for mandamus and for prohibition but only upon an 
appeal and a record of the 
[7] Finally, refusal the court to order completion of 
the depositions prior to the hearing, even if we assume (we 
do not so hold) that such refusal was erroneous, would 
likewise appear not to have violated petitioner's rights in a 
constitutional or jurisdictional sense. He was given a full 
42 C.2d-23 
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opportunity to subpoena and produce witnesses, and to elicit 
evidence, both oral and by affidavit, and he did so, at the 
hearing on the security motions.7 [8] As declared in Whit-
ley v. SuperiM Court (1941), 18 Cal.2d 75, 81 [113 P.2d 
449], quoting from 12 American Jurisprudence, Constitu-
tional Law, section 637, page 327, "A hearing before judg-
ment, with full opportunity to present all the evidence and 
the arguments which the party deems important, is all that 
can be adjudged vital under the guaranty of due process 
of law . " (See also Wood v. Pendola ( 1934), 1 Cal.2d 
435, 444 [ 35 P .2d 526] ; Dohany v. Rogers ( 1929), 281 U.S. 
362, 369 [50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904] .) 
[9] Petitioner cites no authority and we are aware of 
none which declares opportunity to take depositions of wit-
nesses prior to a trial or hearing to be a requirement of due 
process. [10] Mere erroneous construction of statutes does 
not constitute a denial of due process. (Neblett v. Carpenter 
(1938), 305 U.S. 297, 302 [59 S.Ct. 170, 83 L.Ed. 182].) 
[11] Moreover, as pointed out by respondent, under our 
perpetuation of evidence statutes (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2083-
2089; see also MacLeod v. Su,perior Court (1952), 115 Cal. 
App.2d 180 [251 P.2d 728]) it would seem that plaintiff-
petitioner, on proper showing, could have taken the deposi-
tions of defendants prior to filing his stockholder's derivative 
action, and have thereby discovered whether there was suffi-
cient probability of benefit to the corporation to justify bring-
ing the action at all. [12] Section 834, which provides for 
the security motions, by its terms appears to apply only to 
actions already commenced. 
In addition, it may be noted that under the New Jersey 
statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen 
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 8 (1949), 337 U.S. 541 
[69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528], the right of the corporation 
7We do not have before us and we do not here consider the effect of 
the security statute with respect to denial of the right to take the deposi-
tion of a non-resident witness whose testimony material to the motion is 
not otherwise available. 
"The ultimate question in that ease, as stated by the court (p. 543 of 
337 U.S.) "is whether a federal court, having jurisdiction of a stock-
holders' derivative action only because the parties are of diverse citizen-
ship, must apply a statute of the forum state which makes the plaintiff, 
if unsuccessful, liable for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's 
fees, of the defense and entitles the corporation to require security for 
their payment.'' The act expressly provided that it should ''take effect 
immediately and shall apply to all such actions [stockholders' derivative 
suits by stockholders holding less than five per centum in value (or 
Apr.1954] MELANCON v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
[42 C.2d 698; 268 P.2d 1050] 
707 
to require plaintiff to "give security for the reasonable ex-
penses, including counsel fees,'' is absolute (when it arises 
at all, under the terms of the act) unlike the California 
statute, does not depend upon a of nonprobability 
of benefit to the corporation from prosecution of the deriva-
tive action. Consequently it is apparent that in the invoked 
constitutional aspect it is not necessary to the sustaining of 
the statute now before us that such a showing be made or that 
plaintiff be accorded the right he claims of taking depositions 
in order to support his claim of probable benefit. 
[13] Petitioner further urges that he is entitled to pro-
ceed with the depositions he seeks, in the course of preparing 
for the eventual trial of the derivative action, even though 
he has not as yet complied with the order for the posting of 
security. It seems clear, however, that the taking of deposi-
tions for such purpose would constitute a step in the "prose-
cution'' of the action and therefore falls within the stay 
provisions of section 834. 9 (See Ray Wong v. Earle C. An-
thony, Inc. (1926), 199 Cal. 15, 18 [247 P. 894], in which 
it is stated that ''The term 'prosecution' is sufficiently com-
prehensive to include every step in an action from its 
$50,000.00 market value) of the corporation's aggregate shares] ... now 
pending ... and to all future actions ... '' 
In relation to constitutionality, the court held that such statute ap-
peared to be substantially prospective in application: ''Its terms do not 
appear to require an interpretation that it creates new liability against 
the plaintiff for expenses incurred by the defense previous to its enact-
ment. The statute would admit. of a construction that plaintiff's liability 
begins only from the time when the Act was passed or perhaps when the 
corporation's application for security is granted and that security for 
expenses and counsel fees which 'may be incurred' does not include those 
which have been incurred before one or the other of these periods." 
As to the ultimate question-whether the statute (which as emphasized 
by ,Justices Douglas and Frankfurter is inherently procedural in effect) 
was so narrowly and exclusiv<"ly state-court procedural in character as 
to not be properly enforceable in actions maintained in federal courts 
because of diversity of citizenship-the court pointed out that (pp. 555-
5:)6 of 337 U.S.) "Rules which lawyers call procedural do not always 
exhaust their effect by regulating procedure. But this statute is not 
merely a regulation of procedure. . . . [I]t creates a new liability where 
none existed before, for it makes a stockholder who institutes a derivative 
action liable for the expense to which he puts the corporation and other 
defendants, if he does not make good his claims ... If all the Act did 
was to create this liability, it would clearly be substantive ... We do 
not think a statute which so conditions the stockholder's action can be 
disregarded by the federal court as a mere procedural device." 
9 Section 8:)4, subd. (c): "If any such motion [for security] is filed, 
no pleadings need be filed by the corporation or any other defendant, and 
the prosecution of such action shall be stayed, until 10 days after such 
motion shall have been disposed of." 
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commencement to its final determination.") [14] It there-
fore appears that the court has properly refused to proueed 
further with respect to the depositions until such time as 
petitioner may with the order respecting security. 
The fact that defendants may take such depositions in the 
meantime, if be so advised, does not deprive petitioner 
of equal of the law. As declared in the Hogan 
and the power of the Legislature in this 
type of is and it is no more a denial of 
equal protection to petitioner's right to take deposi-
tions until he ordered than it is to require 
that he furnish such security while not a reciprocal 
requirement of defendants. as emphasized in 
both the and cases, the cause of action, 
if any, does not belong to plaintiff. It belongs to the corpo-
ration. The statute neither adds one iota to nor subtracts 
one iota from the cause of action. [16] Such statute, there-
fore, applied as we have applied only to actions instituted 
since its enactment, is wholly procedural in its effect in a 
state court; it merely prescribes the conditions on which a 
volunteer may maintain a suit on the corporation's 
cause of action. No personal right of plaintiff's is to be 
litigated; if he becomes liable for the reasonable expenses of 
others which he has caused them to incur in successfully 
defending against his unsuccessful action for the corporation, 
it is a result of his own volunteer act in subjecting himself 
and the persons he names as defendants to the procedures 
of the court. 
[17] It may further be noted that if plaintiff does post 
the security ordered by the court and then proceeds with the 
securing of evidence by way of depositions he may thereafter, 
as an incident of the procedural scheme set up by section 
834, apply to the trial court for a decrease in the amount 
of security "upon showing that the security provided ... 
is excessive." 
The peremptory writs are denied and the alternative writs 
discharged. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and 
Spence, concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
It is my considered that a full and substantial 
compliance with the laws of this state requires this court to 
issue a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to 
MELANCON v. SuPERIOR UouRT 
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enforce to take certain The 
right to take is an essential element in the process 
of discovery and nowhere in the law is more im-
portant than in stockholder derivative actions; since in this 
type of action the shareholder must obtain 
his facts from the records of the or from the 
corporate officers. To the 
a case is in effect a of the 
holder's derivative action. 
In the case at bar, petitioner filed a shareholder's derivative 
action against the corporation and certain of its officers and 
directors. Thereafter the trial court issued subpoenas duces 
tecum re depositions which were duly served upon Mr. Les-
sing and Mr. Johnson individually and upon Mr. Johnson 
as secretary of the defendant corporation. Petitioner was 
unable to perfect service upon Mr. Walt Disney and Mr. 
Roy Disney. On July 6, 1953, and to said subpoena, 
Mr. Lessing delivered copies of certain corporate records to 
petitioner and was sworn as a witness. When Mr. Lessing 
refused to answer 47 of the he was ordered to appear 
in the superior court on July 13, 1953, to show cause why he 
should not answer the questions propounded by counsel for 
petitioner. 
Meanwhile all of the defendants filed a motion, pursuant 
to section 834 of the Corporations Code, to require plaintiff 
to furnish security for expenses and attorney's fees. At the 
time this motion was filed no depositions, except the incom-
pleted one of Mr. Lessing, had been taken; nevertheless the 
trial court stayed further proceedings on the depositions until 
after the hearing and order on the motions for security. In 
so doing the court committed a grave error based upon a 
complete misconception of section 834 of the Corporations 
Code. 
Under the provisions of said section 834, the motion for 
security may be supported on either of two grounds: 
"(1) That there is no reasonable probability that the prose-
cution of the cause of action alleged in the complaint against 
the moving party will benefit the corporation or its security 
holders; (2) 'fhat the moving party, if other than the cor-
poration, did not participate in the transaction complained 
of in any capacity." In order to determine if either of these 
two elements are present and whether the motion for security 
should be granted, the trial court conducts a hearing, at 
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which time, under the provisions of section 834, the court 
considers ''such evidence written or oral, by witnesses or 
affidavit, as may be material: (a) to the ground or grounds 
upon which the motion is based, or (b) to a determination 
of the probable reasonable expenses, . . . '' 
It thus becomes apparent that the hearing on the motion 
for security is in effect a "little trial" of the case in chief 
at which the plaintiff must make his showing of merit or risk 
complete defeat. In order to show that his case has merit, 
it is usually necessary for the shareholder plaintiff to sub-
poena certain corporate records and take the depositions of 
various corporate officers in advance of the hearing. Without 
these essential elements in the process of discovery the share-
holder may have a valid cause of action which will benefit 
the corporation but he may be unable to produce the necessary 
evidence at the hearing on the motion for security. No im-
pediment should be placed in the way of a shareholder plain-
tiff which would prevent the securing of this necessary evi-
dence. 
When the trial court stayed further proceedings on the 
depositions, until after the hearing on the motion for security, 
petitioner was in effect forced into the hearing without the 
necessary depositions and evidence. Such a situation could 
not have been contemplated by the Legislature when it en-
acted section 834. It is true that section 834 provides that 
after the motion for security has been filed ''no pleadings 
need be filed by the corporation or any other defendant, and 
the prosecution of such action shall be stayed, until 10 days 
after such motion shall have been disposed of.'' But this 
does not mean that the shareholder cannot continue to secure 
evidence which is necessary for the hearing. Nor does it mean 
that the avenues of discovery should be closed to the share-
holder plaintiff. The mere fact that the plaintiff must show 
the merits of his case at the hearing on the motion for security, 
requires by necessary implication that he be permitted to con-
tinue his quest for the necessary evidence. 
Section 2021 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that 
''The testimony of a witness in this State may be taken by 
deposition in any action at any time after the service of the 
summons or the appearance of the defendant. . . . " In 
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.2d 386, 
393 [159 P.2d 944], this court stated that: "Ordinarily the 
trial court has no discretion to refuse to exercise its powers 
so far as necessary to secure to a litigant the right to a 
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deposition in the cases defined by the code. [Citations. J The 
language of 11ection 2021 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
providing that 'The testimony of a witness . . . may be 
taken by deposition' confers upon litigants the right to take 
depositions. (See [my dissent in] v. Court, 
16 Cal.2d 260, 264 [105 P.2d 975] .) " It is well recognized 
that ''Statutes authorizing· the taking of depositions should 
be liberally construed with a view to effecting their objects 
and promoting justice, and to the end that a litigant in a 
pending action may be affordAd a reasonable opportunity to 
procure available testimony in support of his cause." (26 
C.J.S., Depositions, § 4, p. 810; citing Pollak v. Superior 
Cour·t, 197 Cal. 389 [240 P. 1006] ; JJ1oran v. Superior Coud, 
38 Cal.App.2d 328 [100 P.2d 1096] ; and Zellerbach v. Su-
perior Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 49 [39 P.2d 252) .) 
In support of his position petitioner relies upon section 
2021 of the Code of Civil Procedure and upon cases in which 
mandamus has issued to compel the lower court to enforce 
the right to take depositions or to perpetuate testimony. 
(McClatchy Newspape1·s v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.2d 
386; Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 559 [212 P.2d 878]; 
Snperior Ins. Co. v. Supen·or Court, 37 Cal.2d 749 [235 P.2d 
833] .) In an attempt to distinguish these cases, the majority 
has stated in effect that in the instant case the hearing on the 
motions for security has already been held and there is thus 
no auequate reason why petitioner should be permitted to 
proceed with the taking of depositions. 'rhe majority argues 
that under such circumstances "it appears that the remedy by 
appeal from the judgment of dismissal which presumably will 
follow if the ordered security is not furnished is not only an 
adequate, but is clearly a more appropriate remedy than the 
·writs here sought.'' Such reasoning loses sight of the fact that 
''Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to secure the enforce-
ment of a litigant's statutory right to take depositions, and 
an appeal from a final judgment is neither speedy nor ade-
quate where a trial court improperly n~fused to order that 
a deposition be taken." (McClatchy Newspapers v. Super1"ot· 
Conrt, supra, 26 Cal.2d 386, 392.) In Brown v. Superior 
Court, supra, 34 Cal.2d 559, 562, this court stated, after citing 
several cases, that "Three situations are presented by the 
above cases: ( 1) where a party seeks to perpetuate testimony 
under section 2083 et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure 
prior to the bringing of an action; (2) where the deposition is 
sought under section 2021 after commencement of the action 
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and trial; and where the deposition is sought 
under section 2021 and retrial upon a possible 
reversal of the judgment. IN e see no good reason for differen-
tiating between these three situations insofar as appealability 
is concerned, or for departing from the cases which hold that 
the order is not such orders are, of 
course, reviewable from the final judgment, a 
party should not he to to trial without the 
benefits afforded to which he is entitled, and 
it is well settled that under such circumstances the burden, 
expense and involved in a trial render an appeal from 
an eventual judgment an inadequate remedy." 
In the instant case desired to take certain deposi-
tions before the hearing on the motion for security was had, 
but the trial court further proceedings on the deposi-
tions until after the and order on the motions for 
security. Such arbitrary aetion on the part of the trial court 
forced petitioner to appear at the hearing without the benefit 
of the depositions. In its attempt to justify the trial court's 
refusal to enforce petitioner's right to take depositions prior 
to the hearing on security, the majority takes the position 
that petitioner's rights were not violated since "He was 
given a full opportunity to subpoena and produce witnesses, 
and to elicit evidence, both oral and by affidavit, and he did 
so, at the hearing on the security motions.'' Such fallacious 
reasoning is similar to saying that where a person is given 
a trial and allowed to produce witnesses it is permissible to 
deny him the right to take depositions. It must be remem-
bered that ''The statutory right to take depositions may not 
be withheld or curtailed in the discretion of the court. The 
cases have consistently so held. 'Insofar as the propriety of 
the use of the writ for this purpose is concerned, it is well 
settled that there is a clear duty on the trial court to enforce 
the statutory right to a deposition and compel a witness to 
testify.' (Brown v. Su,perior Court, 34 Cal.2d 559 [212 P.2d 
878].)" (Carnation Co. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 
138, 141 [214 P.2d 552].) 
The case at bar presents the unique situation wherein the 
shareholder vvas denied the to take depositions 
once the defendants had filed their motions for security. 
He was thus denied certain essential rights of discovery which 
have become a part of our law. Thereafter petitioner was 
forced into the hearing on the motion for security without the 
benefit of the desired depositions and the trial court required 
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more than in because it found among other 
things ''That there is no reasonable probability that the 
prosecution of the cause of action alleged ... will benefit the 
or its holders.'' In granting the motions 
for security the trial court did, however, refuse to require 
security for the "third party defendant" on the ground that 
it had no constitutional authority to grant such a motion. 
vVith this I am in full accord. For the reasons outlined in my 
dissent in BeyeTbach v. Juno Oil Co., ante, p. 11 [265 P.2d 
1], it is my considered opinion that section 834 of the 
Corporations Code is unconstitutional and a denial of equal 
protection of the law insofar as it requires a plaintiff share-
holder to post security for third party defendants who are 
neither directors, officers, nor employees of the defendant 
corporation. 
As part of its order requiring security the court stayed fur-
ther prosecution of the action by plaintiff. The majority at-
tempts to interpret this stay of prosecution as being sufficient 
to deny petitioner the right to proceed with the taking of 
depositions. In support of this position they rely on the 
case of Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc., 199 Cal. 15, 
18 [247 P. 894], in which it is stated that "The term 'prose-
cution' is sufficiently comprehensive to include every step in 
an action from its commencement to its final determination." 
The vVong case involved an action for malicious prosecution 
wherein it >vas essential to the cause of action that the prose-
cution had begun. In such a case a comprehensive definition 
of this nature may have been proper. However, it is clear 
that the Legislature did not intend the word prosecution as 
used in section 834 of the Corporations Code to have such an 
extensive connotation. It is true that section 834, subdivision 
(c), provides that "If any such motion is filed, no pleadings 
need be filed by the corporation or any other defendant, and 
the prosecution of such action shall be stayed, until 10 days 
after such motion shall have been disposed of"; however, there 
is no indication anywhere in the section that the plaintiff share-
holder is to stop all activity. The mere fact that a hearing on 
the motion for required illustrates the need for 
Such activity must necessarily 
involve the the preparation of affidavits, 
the subpoenaing of witnesses, and the pursuit of various ave-
nues of discovery, including the taking o£ depositions. Section 
834 requires that all prosecution be stayed, but there is noth-
ing to indicate that the word prosecution, as used, was meant 
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to include every step in an action, since by its very terms, 
section 834 requires a hearing following the motion for security 
at which time the court ''shall consider such evidence, written 
or oral, by witness or affidavit, as may be material: . . . '' 
Therefore if further proceedings are required after the mo-
tion for security has been filed the term prosecution could 
not have been used in such a way as to include ''every step 
in an action from its commencement to its final determina-
tion.'' 
In view of the fact that section 834 requires the shareholder 
plaintiff to produce evidence, at the hearing, which will sub-
stantiate his claim, it is not reasonable to say that the same 
section also prohibits him from proceeding to take the deposi-
tions through which such required evidence can be obtained. 
Such an interpretation would have the same effect as saying 
that a plaintiff cannot take his depositions until after the trial 
of his case. In shareholder derivative actions, the hearing 
on the motion for security is actually a "little trial" of the 
case and in many cases it is the deciding factor. If a share-
holder is unable to secure the necessary depositions he may 
be unable to secure the evidence needed to oppose the motion 
for security. If the necessary evidence is not available at 
the security hearing plaintiff may be required to post security 
for the expenses and attorneys' fees of all the defendants. 
Such expenses are frequently quite extensive, especially where 
a great many directors and officers are involved as defendants. 
The higher the security requirement the more insurmountable 
the barrier to continuing the derivative action. In the in-
stant case the trial court required petitioner to post more than 
$65,000 in security before proceeding. How many small 
shareholders are in a position to raise $65,000? How many 
could raise even one half that amount? It thus becomes ap-
parent that the outcome of the hearing on the motion for 
security may be the deciding factor of the entire derivative 
action. 
Recognizing the crucial nature of the security requirement, 
what brand of justice would prohibit the taking of depositions 
preceding a hearing on the motion for security? On the 
contrary, the courts of this state have consistently upheld the 
right to take depositions and have frequently stated that it 
would not be proper to compel a party to proceed to trial 
without the depositions for which he had made proper re-
quest. In the case of McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior 
Cmwt, S1{,pra, 26 Cal.2d 386, 393, this court discussed Hays 
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v. Supe1·ior Court, 16 Cal.2d 260 [105 P.2d 975], and Patrick 
Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.App.2d 424 [56 P.2d 
1283], and then stated that although in those cases "the de-
ferment of the time of taking the deposition was deemed justi-
fied by reason of special circumstances, there is no suggestion 
in those cases that it would be proper to compel a party to 
proceed to trial without a deposition for which a proper 
request has been made.'' By the same reasoning it is not 
proper to compel a party to proceed to a hearing, which may 
be the turning point of the case, without depositions for 
which a proper request had been made. 
It is true that petitioner may have the amount of the 
security reduced upon a proper showing that such amount is 
excessive; however such a showing requires additional evi-
dence which may not be available to petitioner unless he is 
permitted to take certain depositions. In the instant case 
the trial court stayed further proceedings on the depositions 
both before and after the order for security had been ren-
dered. This placed the shareholder petitioner in the unique 
position of not only being prevented from taking depositions 
in order to oppose the motion for security but of also being 
prohibited from taking depositions which could uncover the 
evidence needed to reduce the security requirement. Thus 
petitioner could not secure the depositions needed to oppose 
the motion for security nor could he secure the depositions 
needed to show why such security should be reduced. 
If this court sustains such action on the part of the trial 
court, it will merely be tying another knot in the cord which 
is gradually snuffing 01d the rights of corporate shareholders 
to 1naintain derivative actions. For these reasons I would 
grant the writ of mandate to compel the superior court to 
enforce petitioner's right to take the requested depositions. 
